# kerr-folly-rewarding-a-hoping-b-academy-management-1975-12 ## Veille Dysfunction of organizational reward systems — Incentive-goal misalignment — Organizational behavior — Academy of Management Journal ## Titre Article On the Folly of Rewarding A, While Hoping for B ## Date 1975-12 ## URL https://www.ou.edu/russell/UGcomp/Kerr.pdf ## Keywords reward systems, incentive misalignment, organizational behavior, folly, rewarding A while hoping for B, objective criteria, behavioral visibility, organizational hypocrisy, politics, war, medicine, universities, orphanages, management, motivation, type I error, type II error, Steven Kerr, Academy of Management ## Authors Steven Kerr ## Ton **Profile**: Academic article in organizational behavior, analytical-satirical register, intermediate to advanced level. **Description**: Steven Kerr adopts the tone of a sharp-eyed observer, blending academic rigor with biting irony. The article proceeds by accumulating concrete examples from varied domains (politics, war, medicine, universities, business) to demonstrate a systemic pattern. The style is direct and incisive, using comparative tables between "desired behavior" and "actually rewarded behavior" to make the demonstration irrefutable. The author's authority rests on his position as a management researcher at Ohio State University. The target audience consists of management researchers, executives, and HR leaders confronting the inefficiency of their incentive systems. The article has become an essential classic of organizational behavior, republished in 1995 in the Academy of Management Executive with an update confirming the persistence of the identified problems. ## Pense-betes - Central thesis: organizations systematically violate a fundamental law of social behavior by rewarding the behaviors they wish to discourage, while failing to reward those they want to reinforce - Individuals seek to identify rewarded activities, then strive to accomplish them (or to feign accomplishing them), often to the near-total exclusion of activities that are not rewarded - **Politics**: candidates speak in vague official objectives because concrete operational objectives are controversial and cost votes -- voters reward vagueness and punish precision - **War**: in Vietnam, soldiers returned home after a fixed duration, regardless of the war's outcome -- total misalignment between the organizational objective (victory) and the individual incentive (survival + return). In WWII, troops returned once the war was won, aligning incentives - **Medicine**: physicians prefer false positives (diagnosing a healthy person as sick) over false negatives (missing an illness), because the system punishes missed diagnoses more than unnecessary treatments - **Universities**: claim to value teaching but reward only publication for tenure -- a good teacher without publications is denied tenure while a researcher who is mediocre at teaching advances - **Orphanages**: the goal is to place children in good homes, but bureaucratic rules make adoption nearly impossible -- staff are rewarded for following procedures, not for successful placements - **Businesses**: say they want long-term growth, teamwork, and innovation, but reward quarterly profits, individual performance, and conformity - Kerr identifies **four root causes** of the misalignment: (1) fascination with measurable "objective" criteria when the real objectives are subjective, (2) overemphasis on highly visible behaviors at the expense of less observable ones, (3) organizational hypocrisy (claiming to want X while really wanting Y), (4) emphasis on morality or fairness rather than efficiency - The "fascination with the objective" is particularly insidious: publications are easier to count than teaching quality, and scored baskets are more observable than decisive assists - Article republished in 1995 in the Academy of Management Executive, confirming that the patterns identified 20 years earlier remained pervasive in public and private organizations - This text is a foundational classic cited in nearly every organizational behavior and management course -- relevant for understanding why organizational transformations (including AI adoption) fail when incentives fail to follow suit ## RésuméDe400mots In "On the Folly of Rewarding A, While Hoping for B," Steven Kerr demonstrates that organizations systematically make the mistake of rewarding behaviors that run contrary to their stated objectives. His thesis rests on a fundamental principle: individuals seek to identify what is actually rewarded, then strive to accomplish those activities, often to the near-total exclusion of what is not rewarded. Kerr illustrates this pattern across multiple domains. In politics, voters reward candidates who speak in vague official objectives and punish those who propose concrete but controversial operational objectives. In a military context, he contrasts the Vietnam War -- where soldiers returned home after a fixed duration, regardless of outcome, completely misaligning their incentives -- with World War II, where return depended on victory, aligning individual and organizational objectives. In medicine, he shows that physicians favor false positives (diagnosing a healthy patient as sick) over false negatives (missing an illness), because the system punishes missed diagnoses far more severely than unnecessary treatments. In universities, institutions claim to value teaching but reward only published research for tenure decisions. In orphanages, the goal is to place children in good homes, but bureaucratic rules make adoption nearly impossible. In business, organizations say they want long-term growth, teamwork, and innovation, but reward quarterly profits, individual performance, and conformity. Kerr identifies four root causes of this chronic misalignment. First, the fascination with "objective," measurable criteria pushes organizations to ignore important but hard-to-quantify goals. Second, the overemphasis on highly visible behaviors (publishing papers, scoring points) overshadows less observable but equally crucial contributions (teaching, building team spirit). Third, organizational hypocrisy: some organizations are dishonest about their true objectives. Fourth, emphasis on morality or fairness rather than efficiency leads to reward systems based on what "should" be valued rather than on what would actually produce the desired results. Republished in 1995 with an update, the article confirms the persistence of these patterns twenty years later. This foundational text remains one of the most cited articles in organizational behavior and retains its full relevance for anyone designing incentive systems -- including in the current context of AI-driven transformation. ## GrapheDeConnaissance - Steven Kerr —publie→ On the Folly of Rewarding A, While Hoping for B (DOCUMENT, 0.98) - Steven Kerr —affirme_que→ les organisations récompensent des comportements contraires à leurs objectifs déclarés (AFFIRMATION, 0.95) - Steven Kerr —affirme_que→ les individus accomplissent en priorité les activités réellement récompensées (AFFIRMATION, 0.95) - Steven Kerr —affirme_que→ les universités récompensent la publication mais pas la qualité de l'enseignement (AFFIRMATION, 0.92) - Steven Kerr —affirme_que→ le système médical punit davantage les faux négatifs que les faux positifs (AFFIRMATION, 0.9) - Désalignement incitatif —observé_dans→ Guerre du Vietnam (EVENEMENT, 0.9) - Alignement des incitations —observé_dans→ Seconde Guerre mondiale (EVENEMENT, 0.88) - Fascination criteres objectifs —permet→ désalignement des systèmes de récompenses (CONCEPT, 0.9) - Hypocrisie organisationnelle —permet→ désalignement des systèmes de récompenses (CONCEPT, 0.85) - Steven Kerr —affirme_que→ les comportements très visibles éclipsent les contributions moins observables (AFFIRMATION, 0.88) - Steven Kerr —affirme_que→ les entreprises récompensent les profits trimestriels et le conformisme tout en espérant croissance long terme, innovation et travail d'équipe (AFFIRMATION, 0.88) --- Canonical: https://www.thekb.eu/en/fiches/kerr-folly-rewarding-a-hoping-b-academy-management-1975-12/