Product announcement post from **Block Engineering** signed by **Thomas Petersen** (*Principal Designer & Builder*), published on **August 18, 2026**, ~1,800 words across thirteen short sections, introducing **Buzz Projects** — a **software forge hosted on its own relay**: Git repositories, branches, pull requests, issues, review and merge, multi-repo projects, an activity feed, all linked to conversation channels. The post's standfirst and thesis: *« Coding agents are the terminal for your computer. Buzz is the terminal for your network. »* Three contributions. **(A) A trust doctrine grounded in *ex post* proof rather than *ex ante* authorization**: on one side *« No forced guardrails, no limitations on what your agents are allowed to help you with »*, on the other *« Every push, review, approval, and merge is a signed Nostr event. If an agent authors a patch, you can see which agent produced it and which human authorized that agent to act »*; the section closes on a stated direction — *« we are already exploring ideas around agent trust protocols informed by past behavior »*. **(B) Git interoperability without proprietary tooling**: *« These are standard git repositories… You can fetch, clone, pull, and push over plain Smart HTTP, with no custom tooling or wrapper CLI required »*, with the clé Nostr serving as a single identity — *« The same npub that signs your messages signs your pushes. »* **(C) A distinction between execution surface and network presence**: *« A terminal gives an agent somewhere to execute commands and change files, but it does not give it a persistent place in the network. Buzz does. »* The post produces no figures and contains no outbound links; it qualifies itself as preliminary six times (*« still very basic »*, *« fairly elementary »*, *« still under experiments »*), and Projects lives under the **Experiments** tab of Buzz Desktop.
#Buzz#Buzz Projects#Block
**Thomas Petersen** — *« Principal Designer & Builder »* chez **Block** · auteur unique et signataire du billet ; première apparition dans le corpus. Publié le **18 août 2026** sur le blog **Block Engineering**. Troisième signature Block sur Buzz en un mois · après Tyler Longwell (21 juillet) et Atish Patel (6 août) · et la première non-ingénieur.
Official product page from **DeepSeek**, published on **August 13, 2026**, **unsigned**, ~450 words, announcing the *developer preview* release of **DeepSeek Harness** (`dsh`) — a coding-agent harness **open source under the MIT license**, whose repository opened the same day. A three-word thesis, repeated in the title and in the repository description: *« Everything is a plugin »*, paired with a second promise, *« Every run is traceable »*. The page states the equation *« AGENT = MODEL + HARNESS »* and lists the pluggable capabilities — *« models, tools, skills, sessions, sandboxes, storage, loops, scheduling, and the UI »*. Four modes ship: **Standard** (full coding agent), **Code** (tools exposed via the *Code Mode SDK*, letting the model compose multi-step operations inside a TypeScript program), **Minimal** (*« two-tool coding agent with persistent bash and str_replace_editor »*, explicitly *« for benchmarking models in a minimal environment »*), and **Creator** (runtime inspection, in-memory plugin testing). The technical substance sits in the repository, not on the page: `docs/architecture.md` states a logging invariant — *« Model-visible means logged. Anything that reaches a model request must be reconstructable from the log, and a runtime invariant asserts it »* — and states that *« there is no privileged core to patch »*. The technical core is not DeepSeek's own: DSH is built on **Cordis** (the `cordiverse` project, a third party), **vendored** into `vendor/` with a manifest and a sync procedure, and the page places the *« Cordis paper »* at the same navigation level as "GitHub" and "Developer docs". Two LLM adapters ship — `dsh-llm-deepseek` and `dsh-llm-pi-ai`, a generic multi-provider adapter. The repository warns in capitals: *« THERE WILL BE COMPATIBILITY-BREAKING CHANGES »*, and `CLAUDE.md` specifies that `SESSION_FORMAT_VERSION` stays at `0` *« with no compatibility promise »*, with backends rejecting old on-disk formats. Timeline: DSH ships on the day **DeepSeek-V4-Pro reaches GA**, three days before a new API pricing schedule takes effect on **August 16, 2026 at 16:00 UTC**, with peak/off-peak rates and an off-peak discount of **−50%**.
#DeepSeek Harness#dsh#agent harness
**DeepSeek** (DeepSeek AI, laboratoire chinois) · en tant qu'institution. Page produit **non signée** : aucun auteur · aucun ingénieur mis en avant · aucun billet de blog ni papier technique associé. Le « nous » n'apparaît qu'une fois · en dernière phrase — *« We look forward to exploring the limits of intelligence with developers worldwide »*. Publiée le **13 août 2026**. La page est rendue en JavaScript : `curl` sur l'URL renvoie **HTTP 202 avec un corps vide** · le texte n'existant qu'après exécution du bundle. Deux documents de politique sont liés en pied de page — *Safe Use Policy* et *Data Processing Statement*.
**Block** announcement from **July 21, 2026**, signed by **Tyler Longwell**: **Buzz**, an *open source* and **self-hostable** channel-driven workspace where humans and agents share the same room — chat, search, automation, and **Git hosting** on a single server, built on **Nostr**, an open protocol for signed messages and portable identities. Opening thesis: *« Models can do the work now. Teams still need somewhere to do it together. The bottleneck moved from intelligence to coordination. »* Three engineering pieces. **(A) Agent identity.** The starting point is a refusal — to stop lending one's credentials to a bot: *« We have been letting bots play dress-up as us. It's weird. It's dangerous. »* Each agent gets **its own key**, its owner signs a **narrowly scoped authorization**, and the agent then signs its work with its own identity. The delegation cryptography is conventional; the design decision is less so: *« authorization does not erase authorship »* — the agent remains the author, its *credential* proving who authorized it and under what conditions. Immediate consequences: a leaked agent key is revoked without touching the human identity, and withdrawing the owner prevents the agent from reconnecting, with its active sessions needing to be terminated separately. **(B) Git on object storage.** The observation: *« In the past, Git has always had a convenient rate limiter: humans »* — a group of agents produces months of person-commits and CI in a single afternoon, with many simultaneous writers, on forges sized for human fingers. Buzz stores repositories as **immutable, content-addressed packfiles** plus a **single mutable manifest pointer**; a *push* writes the objects first, then advances the pointer via **conditional compare-and-swap**, that swap being the commit point — workspace events announce the change, they do not define it. The protocol is **specified in TLA+ and model-checked** (durability, reconstruction, concurrent pushes), with the bounded result depending on three explicit object-store guarantees, hence a **conformance suite** every backend must pass. **(C) Interoperability and privacy.** Claude Code, Codex, goose *« and any agent speaking Agent Client Protocol »* work inside Buzz; switching model or harness leaves the project's identity, permissions, and history intact. Telemetry and cancellation travel as ephemeral encrypted messages, memory and cost accounting as durable encrypted messages — *« the server sees routing metadata, not those payloads »*. Memory argument: *« A conventional forge preserves the diff and a green check. Buzz also preserves why the obvious fix was wrong. »* Anti-lock-in argument: if Buzz disappears, the identity and signed history remain verifiable, Git stays Git.
#Buzz#Block#agentic workspace
**Tyler Longwell** — *« Building multi-player AI at Block »* · auteur unique et signataire à la première personne. Publié le **21 juillet 2026** sur le blog Block Engineering.