Threat intelligence report published by Anthropic's **Threat Intelligence** team on **September 10, 2026** on anthropic.com (~36,000 words including indicators of compromise, downloadable PDF, unsigned). It covers abuse disrupted between **December 2025 and August 2026** across **seven** domains: cyber, influence, surveillance, conventional weapons, biology, fraud, distillation. All cases involve Haiku, Sonnet, or Opus; none involve Fable or Mythos, except for one distillation attempt.
#threat intelligence#AI misuse#Generative Threat Group
Anthropic — équipe Threat Intelligence (rattachée aux Safeguards) · rapport institutionnel non signé publié sur anthropic.com.
Article by **Chase Covington**, **Tomer Slaney** (partners, New York) and **David Pralong** (senior partner, Charlotte), published by the *McKinsey Transformation Practice* in **September 2026** (exact day unspecified, dated the 1st by convention); 8 pages, 2 exhibits whose content is not reproduced in the text. **(1)** Finding: the transformation office (TO) is slow to modernize its own tools; in a turnaround involving **3,000** employees, **more than 15** people produced a **300-page** report every four weeks. **(2)** Three pillars entrusted to agents: *performance intelligence*, *single source of truth*, *conversation facilitation*. **(3)** Reported gains: **35 to 40%** of time on core tasks, sometimes **70%**; a central team reduced from **ten to three** people. **(4)** Guardrails: cascading errors between agents, false alerts, traceability of each step. **(5)** Sequence: reporting first, action automation next, change management within the TO. The authors present the text as "a first look at the opportunity for TOs". The cases are not named, no measurement method is described, and two of the tools cited (**Wave**, **Lilli**) belong to McKinsey. The text follows on from [[sternfels-mckinsey-60000-people-20000-agents-officechai-2026-01-14]], where McKinsey already counts its agents among its workforce.
Post by **Ethan Mollick** published on **August 31, 2026** on *One Useful Thing* (~2,200 words). He starts from a security incident to raise an organizational question: when should an AI ask a human for help?
#agency#agency#autonomous agents
Ethan Mollick — professeur à la Wharton School (University of Pennsylvania) · auteur du blog *One Useful Thing* sur Substack.
Capgemini (Aiman Ezzat, CEO) — Investir interview, "boss special": IA agentique as an operational breakthrough, not just another technology; €2bn invested, +30% on application development and −20% incidents, >11% of Q1 bookings, TAM of over $400bn/year by 2030 — but "very far from plug and play" (Investir / Les Echos)
#Aiman Ezzat#Capgemini#IA agentique
Aiman Ezzat (directeur général de Capgemini) · propos recueillis par La Rédaction d'Investir
Research article published in **ACM Queue** (vol. 24, no. 3 — thematic issue "LLMs") on **July 20, 2026**, authored by **Joseph Valente** (Director of Product Management, Alphabet Security) and **Michal Zalewski** (Distinguished Engineer, Alphabet Security strategist — the *lcamtuf* of offensive security). **CC BY 4.0** license, **29,143 downloads** in ten days, **a single bibliographic reference**: the 2014 **BeyondCorp** whitepaper. This is not incidental — the article explicitly positions itself as **BeyondCorp's generic successor** and takes on its function: *"publish the vision so the industry can align to it."* **Thesis**: the **application-boundary model is reaching end of life**. The three assumptions that underpinned BeyondCorp — *accessors are human, actions occur at human speed, the application is the right trust boundary* — are all three obsolete now that AI agents access data at **10 times the rate of humans** and reason over vast unstructured corpora. **Beyond Zero** therefore shifts the trust boundary **from the application to the individual action on the individual resource**, and investigation **from after-the-fact to real-time**. **Four-component architecture forming a loop**: *autonomous governance* (which uses AI to build a living **enterprise world model** — Who / What / How — by explicit analogy with a self-driving car's world model), *event intake* (server, client, and **agent activity** signals: prompts, execution plans, tool invocations), *reasoning engine* (hierarchical AI, **fast** for ABAC at access time and **slow** for inference over a sequence of actions; *allow / deny / challenge* verdict), and *challenge infrastructure* (reversible **challenges** — justification, security key tap, approval, **selfie** — vs. durable **containments**, sometimes lifted only after the security team interviews the employee and their manager). **The central design move is the floor/ceiling split**: **static policies** (the floor, statically verifiable) under a **dynamic reasoning engine** (the ceiling) — an explicit rejection of a *"fully dynamic, hard-to-statically-verify"* model. **The named attack vector**: **ambient authority**, the agent inheriting its human's full, often overprovisioned permissions. **Three reservations noted**: this is a **vision paper, not a war story** — zero production metrics, zero false-positive rate, zero deployment scale, whereas [[uber-engineering-agent-identity-crisis-zero-trust-spire-2026-05-21]] had published a P99 < 40 ms and thousands of agents in production two months earlier; an **internal order-of-magnitude inconsistency** (tens of millions of actions/s in the problem statement vs. thousands of decisions/s in the abstract and conclusion); and a **massive European blind spot** — the described system is also an employee-surveillance apparatus (selfie, client-side signals, baselining against the peer group), without a single line on GDPR, proportionality, or employee representative bodies.
#Beyond Zero#BeyondCorp#zero trust
**Joseph Valente** — Director of Product Management · en charge des efforts de sécurité entreprise au sein d'**Alphabet Security** ; son périmètre couvre l'ensemble des business units d'Alphabet (Google Ads, DeepMind, YouTube, Devices, Cloud). Précédemment à l'origine de ce qui est devenu le **Sovereign Cloud de Google** (l'offre de compute souverain de Google Cloud) — détail notable pour un lectorat européen. Avant Google : cofondateur de Pathify et Ebla · passage par Bain & Company.
Anthropic launches Claude Fable 5 (a Mythos-class model made safe for general use) and Claude Mythos 5 (the same model, with guardrails lifted, restricted to cyberdefenders via Project Glasswing): state-of-the-art performance in software engineering, vision, long-context memory, and life sciences.
Deep Research - AI4* Revolution - 6 pillars of software production - Copilots→Agents transition - Vibe vs Check paradox - FinOps for AI crisis - Governance as critical path - GenAI Landing Zone